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Abstract
The notion of optimality naturally arises in many areas of applied
mathematics and computer science concerned with decision making. Here
we consider this notion in the context of two formalisms used for differ-
ent purposes and in different research areas: graphical games and soft
constraints. We relate the notion of optimality used in the area of soft
constraint satisfaction problems (SCSPs) to that used in graphical games,
showing that for a large class of SCSPs that includes weighted constraints
every optimal solution corresponds to a Nash equilibrium that is also a
Pareto efficient joint strategy.
We also study alternative mappings including one that maps graphical
games to SCSPs, for which Pareto efficient joint strategies and optimal
solutions coincide.
1 Introduction
The concept of optimality is prevalent in many areas of applied mathematics
and computer science. It is of relevance whenever we need to choose among
several alternatives that are not equally preferable. For example, in constraint
optimization, each solution of a constraint problem has a quality level associated
with it and the aim is to choose an optimal solution, that is, a solution with an
optimal quality level.
The aim of this paper is to clarify the relation between the notions of op-
timality used in game theory, commonly used to model multi-agent systems,
and soft constraints. This allows us to gain new insights into these notions
which hopefully will lead to further cross-fertilization among these two different
approaches to model optimality.
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Game theory, notably the theory of strategic games, captures the idea of an
interaction between agents (players). Each player chooses one among a set of
strategies, and it has a payoff function on the game’s joint strategies that allows
the player to take action (simultaneously with the other players) with the aim
of maximizing its payoff. A commonly used concept of optimality in strategic
games is that of a Nash equilibrium. Intuitively, it is a joint strategy that is
optimal for each player under the assumption that only he may reconsider his
action. Another concept of optimality concerns Pareto efficient joint strategies,
which are those in which no player can improve its payoff without decreasing the
payoff of some other player. Sometimes it is useful to consider constrained Nash
equilibria, that is, Nash equilibria that satisfy some additional requirements [6].
For example, Pareto efficient Nash equilibria are Nash equilibria which are also
Pareto efficient among the Nash equilibria.
Soft constraints, see e.g. [2], are a quantitative formalism which allow us
to express constraints and preferences. While constraints state what is accept-
able for a certain subset of the objects of the problem, preferences (also called
soft constraints) allow for several levels of acceptance. An example are fuzzy
constraints, see [4] and [11], where acceptance levels are between 0 and 1, and
where the quality of a solution is the minimal level over all the constraints. An
optimal solution is the one with the highest quality. The research in this area fo-
cuses mainly on algorithms for finding optimal solutions and on the relationship
between modelling formalisms (see [9]).
We consider the notions of optimality in soft constraints and in strategic
games. Although apparently the only connection between these two formalisms
is that they both model preferences, we show that there is in fact a strong
relationship. This is surprising and interesting on its own. Moreover, it might
be exploited for a cross-fertilization among these frameworks.
In considering the relationship between strategic games and soft constraints,
the appropriate notion of a strategic game is here that of a graphical game, see
[7]. This is due to the fact that soft constraints usually involve only a small
subset of the problem variables. This is in analogy with the fact that in a
graphical game a player’s payoff function depends only on a (usually small)
number of other players.
We consider a ‘local’ mapping that associates with each soft constraint sat-
isfaction problem (in short, a soft CSP, or an SCSP) a graphical game. For
strictly monotonic SCSPs (which include, for example, weighted constraints),
every optimal solution of the SCSP is mapped to a Nash equilibrium of the
game. We also show that this local mapping, when applied to a consistent CSP
(that is, a classical constraint satisfaction problem), maps the solutions of the
CSP to the Nash equilibria of the corresponding graphical game. This relation-
ship between the optimal solutions and Nash equilibria holds in general, and
not just for a subclass, if we consider a ‘global’ mapping from the SCSPs to the
graphical games, which is independent of the constraint structure.
We then consider the relationship between optimal solutions of the SCSPs
and Pareto efficiency in graphical games. First we show that the above local
mapping maps every optimal solution of a strictly monotonic SCSP to a Pareto
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efficient joint strategy. We then exhibit a mapping from the graphical games
to the SCSPs for which the optimal solutions of the SCSP coincide with the
Pareto efficient joint strategies of the game.
In [5] a mapping from graphical games to classical CSPs has been defined,
and it has been shown that the Nash equilibria of the games coincide with the
solutions of the CSPs. We can use this mapping, together with our mapping
from the graphical games to the SCSPs, to identify the Pareto efficient Nash
equilibria of the given graphical game. In fact, these equilibria correspond to the
optimal solutions of the SCSP obtained by joining the soft and hard constraints
generated by the two mappings.
The study of the relations among preference models coming from different
fields such as AI and game theory has only recently gained attention. In [1] we
have considered the correspondence between optimality in CP-nets of [3] and
pure Nash equilibria in so-called parametrized strategic games, showing that
there is a precise correspondence between these two concepts.
As mentioned above, a mapping from strategic, graphical and other types of
games to classical CSPs has been considered in [5], leading to interesting results
on the complexity of deciding whether a game has a pure Nash equilibria or
other kinds of desirable joint strategies.
In [12] a mapping from the distributed constraint optimization problems to
strategic graphical games is introduced, where the optimization criteria is to
maximize the sum of utilities. By using this mapping, it is shown that the
optimal solutions of the given problem are Nash equilibria of the generated
game. This result is in line with our findings regarding strictly monotonic
SCSPs, which include the class of problems considered in [12].
2 Preliminaries
In this section we recall the main notions regarding soft constraints and strategic
games.
2.1 Soft constraints
Soft constraints, see e.g. [2], allow to express constraints and preferences. While
constraints state what is acceptable for a certain subset of the objects of the
problem, preferences (also called soft constraints) allow for several levels of ac-
ceptance. A technical way to describe soft constraints is via the use of an
algebraic structure called a c-semiring.
A c-semiring is a tuple 〈A,+,×,0,1〉, where:
• A is a set, called the carrier of the semiring, and 0,1 ∈ A;
• + is commutative, associative, idempotent, 0 is its unit element, and 1 is
its absorbing element;
• × is associative, commutative, distributes over +, 1 is its unit element
and 0 is its absorbing element.
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Elements 0 and 1 represent, respectively, the highest and lowest preference.
While the operator × is used to combine preferences, the operator + induces a
partial ordering on the carrier A defined by
a ≤ b iff a + b = b.
Given a c-semiring S = 〈A,+,×,0,1〉, and a set of variables V , each variable
x with a domain D(x), a soft constraint is a pair 〈def, con〉, where con ⊆ V
and def : ×y∈conD(y)→ A. So a constraint specifies a set of variables (the ones
in con), and assigns to each tuple of values from ×y∈conD(y), the Cartesian
product of the variable domains, an element of the semiring carrier A.
A soft constraint satisfaction problem (in short, a soft CSP or an
SCSP) is a tuple 〈C, V, D, S〉 where V is a set of variables, with the correspond-
ing set of domains D, C is a set of soft constraints over V and S is a c-semiring.
Given an SCSP, a solution is an instantiation of all the variables. The pref-
erence of a solution s is the combination by means of the × operator of all the
preference levels given by the constraints to the corresponding subtuples of the
solution, or more formally,
Πc∈Cdefc(s ↓conc),
where Π is the multiplicative operator of the semiring and defc(s ↓conc) is the
preference associated by the constraint c to the projection of the solution s on
the variables in conc.
A solution is called optimal if there is no other solution with a strictly
higher preference.
Three widely used instances of SCSPs are:
• Classical CSPs (in short CSPs), based on the c-semiring 〈{0, 1},∨,∧,
0, 1〉. They model the customary CSPs in which tuples are either allowed
or not. So CSPs can be seen as a special case of SCSPs.
• Fuzzy CSPs, based on the fuzzy c-semiring 〈[0, 1], max, min, 0, 1〉. In
such problems, preferences are the values in [0, 1], combined by taking the
minimum and the goal is to maximize the minimum preference.
• Weighted CSPs, based on the weighted c-semiring 〈ℜ+, min,+,∞,
0〉. Preferences are costs ranging over non-negative reals, which are ag-
gregated using the sum. The goal is to minimize the total cost.
A simple example of a fuzzy CSP is the following one:
• three variables: x, y, and z, each with the domain {a, b};
• two constraints: Cxy (over x and y) and Cyz (over y and z) defined by:
Cxy := {(aa, 0.4), (ab, 0.1), (ba, 0.3), (bb, 0.5)},
Cyz := {(aa, 0.4), (ab, 0.3), (ba, 0.1), (bb, 0.5)}.
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The unique optimal solution of this problem is bbb (an abbreviation for x = y =
z = b). Its preference is 0.5.
The semiring-based formalism allows one to model also optimization prob-
lems with several criteria. This is done by simply considering SCSPs defined
on c-semirings which are the Cartesian product of linearly ordered c-semirings.
For example, the c-semiring
〈[0, 1]× [0, 1], (max, max), (min, min), (0,0), (1,1)〉
is the Cartesian product of two fuzzy c-semirings. In a SCSP based on such a c-
semiring, preferences are pairs, e.g. (0.1,0.9), combined using the min operator
on each component, e.g. (0.1, 0.8) × (0.3, 0.6)=(0.1, 0.6). The Pareto ordering
induced by using the max operator on each component is a partial ordering. In
this ordering, for example, (0.1, 0.6) < (0.2, 0.8), while (0.1, 0.9) is incomparable
to (0.9, 0.1). More generally, if we consider the Cartesian product of n semirings,
we end up with a semiring whose elements are tuples of n preferences, each
coming from one of the given semirings. Two of such tuples are then ordered if
each element in one of them is better or equal to the corresponding one in the
other tuple according to the relevant semiring.
2.2 Strategic games
Let us recall now the notion of a strategic game, see, e.g., [8]. A strategic game
for a set N of n players (n > 1) is a sequence
(S1, . . ., Sn, p1, . . ., pn),
where for each i ∈ [1..n]
• Si is the non-empty set of strategies available to player i,
• pi is the payoff function for the player i, so pi : S1× . . .×Sn →A, where
A is some fixed linearly ordered set1.
Given a sequence of non-empty sets S1, . . ., Sn and s ∈ S1×. . .×Sn we denote
the ith element of s by si, abbreviate N \ {i} to −i, and use the following
standard notation of game theory, where i ∈ [1..n] and I := i1, . . ., ik is a
subsequence of 1, . . ., n:
• sI := (si1 , . . ., sik),
• (s′i, s−i) := (s1, . . ., si−1, s
′
i, si+1, . . ., sn), where we assume that s
′
i ∈ Si,
• SI := Si1 × . . .× Sik .
A joint strategy s is called
1The use of A instead of the set of real numbers precludes the construction of mixed
strategies and hence of Nash equilibria in mixed strategies, but is sufficient for our purposes.
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• a pure Nash equilibrium (from now on, simply Nash equilibrium) iff
pi(s) ≥ pi(s
′
i, s−i) (1)
for all i ∈ [1..n] and all s′i ∈ Si,
• Pareto efficient if for no joint strategy s′, pi(s
′) ≥ pi(s) for all i ∈ [1..n]
and pi(s
′) > pi(s) for some i ∈ [1..n].
Pareto efficiency can be alternatively defined by considering the following
strict Pareto ordering <P on the n-tuples of reals:
(a1, . . ., an) <P (b1, . . ., bn) iff ∀i ∈ [1..n] ai ≤ bi and ∃i ∈ [1..n] ai < bi.
Then a joint strategy s is Pareto efficient iff the n-tuple (p1(s), . . ., pn(s)) is a
maximal element in the <P ordering on such n-tuples of reals.
To clarify these notions consider the classical Prisoner’s Dilemma game rep-
resented by the following bimatrix representing the payoffs to both players:
C2 N2
C1 3, 3 0, 4
N1 4, 0 1, 1
Each player i represents a prisoner, who has two strategies, Ci (cooperate)
and Ni (not cooperate). Table entries represent payoffs for the players (where
the first component is the payoff of player 1 and the second one that of player
2).
The two prisoners gain when both cooperate (a gain of 3 each). However,
if only one of them cooperates, the other one, who does not cooperate, will
gain more (a gain of 4). If both do not cooperate, both gain very little (that
is, 1 each), but more than the ”cheated” cooperator whose cooperation is not
returned (that is, 0).
Here the unique Nash equilibrium is (N1, N2), while the other three joint
strategies (C1, C2), (C1, N2) and (N1, C2) are Pareto efficient.
2.3 Graphical games
A related modification of the concept of strategic games, called graphical
games , was proposed in [7]. These games stress the locality in taking decision.
In a graphical game the payoff of each player depends only on the strategies of
its neighbours in a given in advance graph structure over the set of players.
More formally, a graphical game for n players with the corresponding
strategy sets S1, . . ., Sn with the payoffs being elements of a linearly ordered
set A, is defined by assuming a neighbour function neigh that given a player i
yields its set of neighbours neigh(i). The payoff for player i is then a function
pi from Πj∈neigh(i)∪{i}Sj to A. We denote such a graphical game by
(S1, . . . , Sn,neigh, p1, . . . , pn, A).
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By using the canonical extensions of these payoff functions to the Cartesian
product of all strategy sets one can then extend the previously introduced con-
cepts to the graphical games. Further, when all pairs of players are neighbours,
a graphical game reduces to a strategic game.
3 Optimality in SCSPs and Nash equilibria in
graphical games
In this section we relate the notion of optimality in soft constraints and the
concept of Nash equilibria in graphical games. We shall see that, while CSPs
are sufficient to obtain the Nash equilibria of any given graphical game, the
opposite direction does not hold. However, graphical games can model, via
their Nash equilibria, a superset of the set of the optimal solutions of any given
SCSP.
The first statement is based on a result in [5], where, given a graphical game,
it is shown how to build a corresponding CSP such that the Nash equilibria of
the game and the solutions of the CSP coincide. Thus, the full expressive power
of SCSPs is not needed to model the Nash equilibria of a game. We will now
focus on the opposite direction: from SCSPs to graphical games. Unfortunately,
the inverse of the mapping defined in [5] cannot be used for this purpose since
it only returns CSPs of a specific kind.
3.1 From SCSPs to graphical games: a local mapping
We now define a mapping from soft CSPs to a specific kind of graphical games.
We identify the players with the variables. Thus, since soft constraints link
variables, the resulting game players are naturally connected. To capture this
aspect, we use graphical games. We allow here payoffs to be elements of an
arbitrary linearly ordered set.
Let us consider a first possible mapping from SCSPs to graphical games. In
what follows we focus on SCSPs based on c-semirings with the carrier linearly
ordered by ≤ (e.g. fuzzy or weighted) and on the concepts of optimal solutions
in SCSPs and Nash equilibria in graphical games.
Given a SCSP P := 〈C, V, D, S〉 we define the corresponding graphical game
for n = |V | players as follows:
• the players: one for each variable;
• the strategies of player i: all values in the domain of the corresponding
variable xi;
• the neighbourhood relation: j ∈ neigh(i) iff the variables xi and xj appear
together in some constraint from C;
• the payoff function of player i:
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Let Ci ⊆ C be the set of constraints involving xi and let X be the set
of variables that appear together with xi in some constraint in Ci (i.e.,
X = {xj | j ∈ neigh(i)}). Then given an assignment s to all variables in
X ∪ {xi} the payoff of player i w.r.t. s is defined by:
pi(s) := Πc∈Cidefc(s ↓conc).
We denote the resulting graphical game by L(P ) to emphasize the fact that
the payoffs are obtained using local information about each variable, by looking
only at the constraints in which it is involved.
One could think of a different mapping where players correspond to con-
straints. However, such a mapping can be obtained by applying the local map-
ping L to the hidden variable encoding [13] of the SCSP in input.
We now analyze the relation between the optimal solutions of a SCSP P and
the Nash equilibria of the derived game L(P ).
3.1.1 General case
In general, these two concepts are unrelated. Indeed, consider the fuzzy CSP
defined at the end of Section 2.1. The corresponding game has:
• three players, x, y, and z;
• each player has two strategies, a and b;
• the neighbourhood relation is defined by:
neigh(x) := {y}, neigh(y) := {x, z}, neigh(z) := {y};
• the payoffs of the players are defined as follows:
– for player x:
px(aa∗) := 0.4, px(ab∗) := 0.1, px(ba∗) := 0.3, px(bb∗) := 0.5;
– for player y:
py(aaa) := 0.4, py(aab) := 0.3, py(abb) := 0.1, py(bbb) := 0.5,
py(bba) := 0.5, py(baa) := 0.3, py(bab) := 0.3, py(aba) := 0.1;
– for player z:
pz(∗aa) := 0.4, pz(∗ab) := 0.3, pz(∗ba) := 0.1, pz(∗bb) := 0.5;
where ∗ stands for either a or b and where to facilitate the analysis we use
the canonical extensions of the payoff functions px and pz to the functions on
{a, b}
3
.
This game has two Nash equilibria: aaa and bbb. However, only bbb is an
optimal solution of the fuzzy SCSP.
One could thus think that in general the set of Nash equilibria is a superset
of the set of optimal solutions of the corresponding SCSP. However, this is not
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the case. Indeed, consider a fuzzy CSP with as before three variables, x, y and
z, each with the domain {a, b}, but now with the constraints:
Cxy := {(aa, 0.9), (ab, 0.6), (ba, 0.6), (bb, 0.9)},
Cyz := {(aa, 0.1), (ab, 0.2), (ba, 0.1), (bb, 0.2)}.
Then aab, abb, bab and bbb are all optimal solutions but only aab and bbb
are Nash equilibria of the corresponding graphical game.
3.1.2 SCSPs with strictly monotonic combination
Next, we consider the case when the multiplicative operator × is strictly mono-
tonic. Recall that given a c-semiring 〈A,+,×,0,1〉, the operator × is strictly
monotonic if for any a, b, c ∈ A such that a < b we have c × a < c × b. (The
symmetric condition is taken care of by the commutativity of ×.)
Note for example that in the case of classical CSPs × is not strictly mono-
tonic, as a < b implies that a = 0 and b = 1 but c ∧ a < c ∧ b does not hold
then for c = 0. Also in fuzzy CSPs × is not strictly monotonic, as a < b does
not imply that min(a, c) < min(b, c) for all c. In contrast, in weighted CSP ×
is strictly monotonic, as a < b in the carrier means that b < a as reals, so for
any c we have c+ b < c + a, i.e., c× a < c× b in the carrier.
So consider now a c-semiring with a linearly ordered carrier and a strictly
monotonic multiplicative operator. As in the previous case, given an SCSP P ,
it is possible that a Nash equilibrium of L(P ) is not an optimal solution of P .
Consider for example a weighted SCSP P with
• two variables, x and y, each with the domain D = {a, b};
• one constraint Cxy := {(aa, 3), (ab, 10), (ba, 10), (bb, 1)}.
The corresponding game L(P ) has:
• two players, x and y, who are neighbours of each other;
• each player has two strategies, a and b;
• the payoffs defined by:
px(aa) := py(aa) := 7, px(ab) := py(ab) := 0,
px(ba) := py(ba) := 0, px(bb) := py(bb) := 9.
Notice that, in a weighted CSP we have a ≤ b in the carrier iff b ≤ a
as reals, so when passing from the SCSP to the corresponding game, we have
complemented the costs w.r.t. 10, when making them payoffs. In general, given
a weighted CSP, we can define the payoffs (which must be maximized) from the
costs (which must be minimized) by complementing the costs w.r.t. the greatest
cost used in any constraint of the problem.
Here L(P ) has two Nash equilibria, aa and bb, but only bb is an optimal so-
lution. Thus, as in the fuzzy case, we have that there can be a Nash equilibrium
of L(P ) that is not an optimal solution of P . However, in contrast to the fuzzy
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case, when the multiplicative operator of the SCSP is strictly monotonic, the
set of Nash equilibria of L(P ) is a superset of the set of optimal solutions of P .
Theorem 1 Consider a SCSP P defined on a c-semiring 〈A,+,×,0,1〉, where
A is linearly ordered and × is strictly monotonic, and the corresponding game
L(P ). Then every optimal solution of P is a Nash equilibrium of L(P ).
Proof. We prove that if a joint strategy s is not a Nash equilibrium of game
L(P ), then it is not an optimal solution of SCSP P .
Let a be the strategy of player x in s, and let sneigh(x) and sY be, respectively,
the joint strategy of the neighbours of x, and of all other players, in s. That is,
V = {x} ∪ neigh(x) ∪ Y and we write s as (a, sneigh(x), sY ).
By assumption there is a strategy b for x such that the payoff px(s
′) for
the joint strategy s′ := (b, sneigh(x), sY ) is higher than px(s). (We use here the
canonical extension of px to the Cartesian product of all the strategy sets).
So by the definition of the mapping L
Πc∈Cxdefc(s ↓conc) < Πc∈Cxdefc(s
′ ↓conc),
where Cx is the set of all the constraints involving x in SCSP P . But the
preference of s and s′ is the same on all the constraints not involving x and ×
is strictly monotonic, so we conclude that
Πc∈Cdefc(s ↓conc) < Πc∈Cdefc(s
′ ↓conc).
This means that s is not an optimal solution of P . 2
3.1.3 Classical CSPs
The above result does not hold for classical CSPs. Indeed, consider a CSP with:
• three variables: x, y, and z, each with the domain {a, b};
• two constraints: Cxy (over x and y) and Cyz (over y and z) defined by:
Cxy := {(aa, 1), (ab, 0), (ba, 0), (bb, 0)},
Cyz := {(aa, 0), (ab, 0), (ba, 1), (bb, 0)}.
This CSP has no solutions in the classical sense, i.e., each optimal solution,
in particular baa, has preference 0. However, baa is not a Nash equilibrium
of the resulting graphical game, since the payoff of player x increases when he
switches to the strategy a.
On the other hand, if we restrict the domain of L to consistent CSPs, that
is, CSPs with at least one solution with value 1, then the discussed inclusion
does hold.
Proposition 1 Consider a consistent CSP P and the corresponding game L(P ).
Then every solution of P is a Nash equilibrium of L(P ).
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Proof. Consider a solution s of P . In the resulting game L(P ) the payoff to
each player is maximal, namely 1. So the joint strategy s is a Nash equilibrium
in game L(P ). 2
The reverse inclusion does not need to hold. Indeed, consider the following
CSP:
• three variables: x, y, and z, each with the domain {a, b};
• two constraints: Cxy and Cyz defined by:
Cxy := {(aa, 1), (ab, 0), (ba, 0), (bb, 0)},
Cyz := {(aa, 1), (ab, 0), (ba, 0), (bb, 0)}.
Then aaa is a solution, so the CSP is consistent. But bbb is not an optimal
solution, while it is a Nash equilibrium of the resulting game.
So for consistent CSPs our mapping L yields games in which the set of Nash
equilibria is a, possibly strict, superset of the set of solutions of the CSP.
However, there are ways to relate CSPs and games so that the solutions and
the Nash equilibria coincide. This is what is done in [5], where the mapping is
from the strategic games to CSPs. Notice that our mapping goes in the opposite
direction and it is not the reverse of the one in [5]. In fact, the mapping in [5]
is not reversible.
3.2 From SCSPs to graphical games: a global mapping
Other mappings from SCSPs to games can be defined. While our mapping
L is in some sense ‘local’, since it considers the neighbourhood of each vari-
able, we can also define an alternative ‘global’ mapping that considers all con-
straints. More precisely, given a SCSP P = 〈C, V, D, S〉, with a linearly or-
dered carrier A of S, we define the corresponding game on n = |V | players,
GL(P ) = (S1, . . . , Sn, p1, . . . , pn, A) by using the following payoff function pi
for player i:
• given an assignment s to all variables in V
pi(s) := Πc∈Cdefc(s ↓conc).
Notice that in the resulting game the payoff functions of all players are the
same.
Theorem 2 Consider an SCSP P over a linearly ordered carrier, and the corre-
sponding game GL(P ). Then every optimal solution of P is a Nash equilibrium
of GL(P ).
Proof. An optimal solution of P , say s, is a joint strategy for which all players
have the same, highest, payoff. So no other joint strategy exists for which some
player is better off and consequently s is a Nash equilibrium. 2
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The opposite inclusion does not need to hold. Indeed, consider again the
weighted SCSP of Subsection 3.1.2 with
• two variables, x and y, each with the domain D = {a, b};
• one constraint, Cxy := {(aa, 3), (ab, 10), (ba, 10), (bb, 1)}.
Since there is one constraint, the mappings L and GL coincide. Thus we have
that aa is a Nash equilibrium of GL(P ) but is not an optimal solution of P .
While the mapping defined in this section has the advantage of providing
a precise subset relationship between optimal solutions and Nash equilibria, as
Theorem 2 states, it has an obvious disadvantage from the computational point
of view, since it requires to consider all the complete assignments of the SCSP.
3.3 Summary of results
Summarizing, in this section we have analyzed the relationship between the
optimal solutions of SCSPs and the Nash equilibria of graphical games. In [5]
CSPs have been shown to be sufficient to model Nash equilibria of graphical
games. Here we have considered the question whether the Nash equilibria of
graphical games can model the optimal solutions of SCSPs. We have provided
two mappings from SCSPs to graphical games, showing that (with some con-
ditions for the local mapping) the set of Nash equilibria of the obtained game
contains the optimal solutions of the given SCSP.
Nash equilibria can be seen as the optimal elements in very specific orderings,
where dominance is based on exactly one change in the joint strategy, while
SCSPs can model any ordering. So we conjecture that it is not possible to find
a mapping from SCSPs to the graphical games for which the optimals coincide
with Nash equilibria. Such a conjecture is also supported by the fact that strict
Nash equilibria can be shown to coincide with the optimals of a CP-net, see [1],
and the CP-nets can model strictly less orderings than the SCSPs, see [10].
4 Optimality in SCSPs and Pareto efficient joint
strategies in graphical games
Next, we relate the notion of optimality in SCSPs to the Pareto efficient joint
strategies of graphical games.
4.1 From SCSPs to graphical games
Consider again the local and the global mappings from SCSPs to graphical
games defined in Sections 3.1 and 3.2. We will now prove that the local mapping
yields a game whose set of Pareto efficient joint strategies contains the set of
optimal solutions of a given SCSP. On the other hand, the global mapping gives
a one-to-one correspondence between the two sets.
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Theorem 3 Consider an SCSP P defined on a c-semiring 〈A,+,×,0,1〉, where
A is linearly ordered and × is strictly monotonic, and the corresponding game
L(P ). Then every optimal solution of P is a Pareto efficient joint strategy of
L(P ).
Proof. Let us consider a joint strategy s of L(P) which is not Pareto efficient.
We will show that s does not correspond to an optimal solution of P . Since
s is not Pareto efficient, there is a joint strategy s′ such that pi(s) ≤ pi(s
′)
for all i ∈ [1..n] and pi(s) < pi(s
′) for some i ∈ [1..n]. Let us denote with
I = {i ∈ [1..n] such that pi(s) < pi(s
′)}. By the definition of the mapping L,
we have:
Πc∈Cidefc(s ↓conc) < Πc∈Cidefc(s
′ ↓conc),
for all i ∈ I and where Ci is the set of all the constraints involving the variable
corresponding to player i in SCSP P . Since the preference of s and s′ is the same
on all the constraints not involving any i ∈ I, and since × is strictly monotonic,
we have:
Πc∈Cdefc(s ↓conc) < Πc∈Cdefc(s
′ ↓conc).
This means that s is not an optimal solution of P . 2
To see that there may be Pareto efficient joint strategies that do not corre-
spond to the optimal solutions, consider a weighted SCSP P with
• two variables, x and y, each with domain D = {a, b};
• constraint Cx := {(a, 2), (b, 1)};
• constraint Cy := {(a, 4), (b, 7)};
• constraint Cxy := {(aa, 0), (ab, 10), (ba, 10), (bb, 0)}.
The corresponding game L(P ) has:
• two players, x and y, who are neighbours of each other;
• each player has two strategies: a and b;
• the payoffs defined by: px(aa) := 8, py(aa) := 6, px(ab) := py(ab) := 0,
px(ba) := py(ba) := 0, px(bb) := 9, py(bb) := 3.
As in Section 3.1 when passing from an SCSP to the corresponding game,
we have complemented the costs w.r.t. 10, when turning them to payoffs. L(P )
has two Pareto efficient joint strategies: aa and bb. (They are also both Nash
equilibria.) However, only aa is optimal in P .
If the combination operator is idempotent, there is no relation between the
optimal solutions of P and the Pareto efficient joint strategies of L(P ). How-
ever, if we use the global mapping defined in Section 3.2, the optimal solutions
do correspond to Pareto efficient joint strategies, regardless of the type of the
combination operator.
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Theorem 4 Consider an SCSP P defined on a c-semiring 〈A,+,×,0,1〉, where
A is linearly ordered, and the corresponding game GL(P ). Then every optimal
solution of P is a Pareto efficient joint strategy of GL(P ), and viceversa.
Proof. Any optimal solution corresponds to a joint strategy where all players
have the same payoff, which is the solution’s preference. Thus, such a joint
strategy cannot be Pareto dominated by any other strategy. Conversely, a
solution corresponding to a joint strategy with the highest payoff is optimal. 2
4.2 From graphical games to SCSPs
Next, we define a mapping from graphical games to SCSPs that relates Pareto
efficient joint strategies in games to optimal solutions in SCSPs. In order to
define such a mapping, we limit ourselves to SCSPs defined on c-semirings which
are the Cartesian product of linearly ordered c-semirings (see Section 2.1). More
precisely, given a graphical game G = (S1, . . . , Sn,neigh, p1, . . . , pn, A) we define
the corresponding SCSP L′(G) = 〈C, V, D, S〉, as follows:
• each variable xi corresponds to a player i;
• the domain D(xi) of the variable xi consists of the set of strategies of
player i, i.e., D(xi) := Si;
• the c-semiring is
〈A1 × · · · ×An, (+1, . . . ,+n), (×1, . . . ,×n), (01, . . . ,0n), (11, . . . ,1n)〉,
the Cartesian product of n arbitrary linearly ordered semirings;
• soft constraints: for each variable xi, one constraint 〈def, con〉 such that:
– con = neigh(xi) ∪ {xi};
– def : Πy∈conD(y)→ A1× · · ·×An such that for any s ∈ Πy∈conD(y),
def(s) := (d1, . . . , dn) with dj = 1j for every j 6= i and di = f(pi(s)),
where f : A → Ai is an order preserving mapping from payoffs
to preferences (i.e., if r > r′ then f(r) > f(r′) in the c-semiring’s
ordering).
To illustrate it consider again the previously used Prisoner’s Dilemma game:
C2 N2
C1 3, 3 0, 4
N1 4, 0 1, 1
Recall that in this game the only Nash equilibrium is (N1, N2), while the
other three joint strategies are Pareto efficient.
We shall now construct a corresponding SCSP based on the Cartesian prod-
uct of two weighted semirings. This SCSP according to the mapping L′ has:2
2Recall that in the weighted semiring 1 equals 0.
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• two variables: x1 and x2, each with the domain {c, n};
• two constraints, both on x1 and x2:
– constraint c1 with def(cc) := 〈7, 0〉, def(cn) := 〈10, 0〉, def(nc) :=
〈6, 0〉, def(nn) := 〈9, 0〉;
– constraint c2 with def(cc) := 〈0, 7〉, def(cn) := 〈0, 6〉, def(nc) :=
〈0, 10〉, def(nn) := 〈0, 9〉;
The optimal solutions of this SCSPs are: cc, with preference 〈7, 7〉, nc,
with preference 〈10, 6〉, cn, with preference 〈6, 10〉. The remaining solution, nn,
has a lower preference in the Pareto ordering. Indeed, its preference 〈9, 9〉 is
dominated by 〈7, 7〉, the preference of cc (since preferences are here costs and
have to be minimized). Thus the optimal solutions coincide here with the Pareto
efficient joint strategies of the given game. This is true in general.
Theorem 5 Consider a graphical game G and a corresponding SCSP L′(G).
Then the optimal solutions of L′(G) coincide with the Pareto efficient joint
strategies of G.
Proof. In the definition of the mapping L′ we stipulated that the mapping
f maintains the ordering from the payoffs to preferences. As a result each
joint strategy s corresponds to the n-tuple of preferences (f(p1(s)), . . . , f(pn(s)))
and the Pareto orderings on the n-tuples (p1(s), . . . , pn(s)) and (f(p1(s)), . . . ,
f(pn(s))) coincide. Consequently a sequence s is an optimal solution of the
SCSP L′(G) iff (f(p1(s)), . . . , f(pn(s))) is a maximal element of the correspond-
ing Pareto ordering. 2
We notice that L′ is injective and, thus, can be reversed on its image. When
such a reverse mapping is applied to these specific SCSPs, payoffs correspond
to projecting of the players’ valuations to a subcomponent.
4.2.1 Pareto efficient Nash equilibria
As mentioned earlier, in [5] a mapping is defined from the graphical games to
CSPs such that Nash equilibria coincide with the solutions of CSP. Instead, our
mapping is from the graphical games to SCSPs, and is such that Pareto efficient
joint strategies and the optimal solutions coincide.
Since CSPs can be seen as a special instance of SCSPs, where only 1, 0,
the top and bottom elements of the semiring, are used, it is possible to add to
any SCSP a set of hard constraints. Therefore we can merge the results of the
two mappings into a single SCSP, which contains the soft constraints generated
by L′ and also the hard constraints generated by the mapping in [5], Below
we denote these hard constraints by H(G). We recall that each constraint in
H(G) corresponds to a player, has the variables corresponding to the player and
it neighbours and allows only tuples corresponding to the strategies in which
the player has no so-called regrets. If we do this, then the optimal solutions
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of the new SCSP with preference higher than 0 are the Pareto efficient Nash
equilibria of the given game, that is, those Nash equilibria which dominate or are
incomparable with all other Nash equilibria according to the Pareto ordering.
Formally, we have the following result.
Theorem 6 Consider a graphical game G and the SCSP L′(G)∪H(G). If the
optimal solutions of L′(G) ∪ H(G) have global preference greater than 0, they
correspond to the Pareto efficient Nash equilibria of G.
Proof. Given any solution s, let p be its preference in L′(G) and p′ in L′(G) ∪
H(G). By the construction of the constraints H(G) we have that p′ equals p if s
is a Nash equilibrium and p′ equals 0 otherwise. The remainder of the argument
is as in the proof of Theorem 5. 2
For example, in the Prisoner’s Dilemma game, the mapping in [5] would
generate just one constraint on x1 and x2 with nn as the only allowed tuple.
In our setting, when using as the linearly ordered c-semirings the weighted
semirings, this would become a soft constraint with
def(cc) := def(cn) := def(nc) = 〈∞,∞〉, def(nn) := 〈0, 0〉.
With this new constraint, all solutions have the preference 〈∞,∞〉, except for
nn which has the preference 〈9, 9〉 and thus is optimal. This solution corre-
sponds to the joint strategy (N1, N2) with the payoff (1, 1) (and thus preference
(9, 9)). This is the only Nash equilibrium and thus the only Pareto efficient
Nash equilibrium.
This method allows us to identify among Nash equilibria the ‘optimal’ ones.
One may also be interested in knowing whether there exist Nash equilibria which
are also Pareto efficient joint strategies. For example, in the Prisoners’ Dilemma
example, there are no such Nash equilibria. To find any such joint strategies we
can use the two mappings separately, to obtain, given a game G, both an SCSP
L′(G) and a CSP H(G) (using the mapping in [5]). Then we should take the
intersection of the set of optimal solutions of L′(G) and the set of solutions of
H(G).
4.3 Summary of results
We have considered the relationship between optimal solutions of SCSPs and
Pareto efficient joint strategies in graphical games. The local mapping of Section
3.1 turns out to map optimal solutions of a given SCSP to Pareto efficient
joint strategies, while the global mapping of Section 3.2 yields a one-to-one
correspondence. For the reverse direction it is possible to define a mapping
such that these two notions of optimality coincide. However, none of these
mappings are onto.
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5 Conclusions
In this paper we related two formalisms that are commonly used to reason
about optimal outcomes: graphical games and soft constraints. While for soft
constraints there is only one notion of optimality, for graphical games there
are at least two. In this paper we have considered Nash equilibria and Pareto
efficient joint strategies.
We have defined a natural mapping from SCSPs that combine preferences
using a strictly monotonic operator to a class of graphical games such that the
optimal solutions of the SCSP are included in the Nash equilibria of the game
and in the set of Pareto efficient joint strategies. In general the inclusions cannot
be reversed. We have also exhibited a mapping from the graphical games to a
class of SCSPs such that the Pareto efficient joint strategies of the game coincide
with the optimal solutions of the SCSP.
These results can be used in many ways. One obvious way is to try to exploit
computational and algorithmic results existing for one of these areas in another.
This has been pursued already in [5] for games by using hard constraints. As
a consequence of our results this can also be done for strategic games by using
soft constraints. For example, finding a Pareto efficient joint strategy involves
mapping a game into an SCSP and then solving it. A similar approach can also
be applied to Pareto efficient Nash equilibria, which can be found by solving a
suitable SCSP.
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